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Why It Doesn’t Matter I’m Not Insane: Descartes’s Madness Doubt in Focus 
 
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt has argued that Descartes’s madness doubt in the First Meditation is 
importantly different from his dreaming doubt.  The madness doubt does not provide a reason for 
doubting the senses, since were the meditator to suppose he is mad, his ability to successfully complete 
the philosophical investigation he sets for himself in the first few pages of the Meditations would be 
undermined.  I argue that Frankfurt’s (1970) interpretation of Descartes’s madness doubt is mistaken and 
that it should be understood as playing the same role as his more famous dreaming doubt.  I focus my 
discussion around four questions: (Q1) What does the meditator have in mind when speaking of 
madness?; (Q2) Why does the meditator so quickly dismiss the madness doubt but take seriously the 
dreaming doubt?; (Q3) Does the madness doubt have the same scope as the dreaming doubt?; and (Q4) 
Why does the meditator bring up the madness doubt at all?   
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Introduction 
The Meditations as a whole is best understood as an attempt to establish a radically new 
approach to the way our minds cognize reality.  One of the main goals of the Meditations is to 
undermine the scholastic doctrine that whatever is in the intellect has previously been in the 
senses and to replace this doctrine with an alternative.  Famously, it is Descartes’s method of 
doubt invoking inter alia dreams and madness that begin this project.  Frankfurt (1970) has 
argued that Descartes dismisses the madness doubt in virtue of the fact that if taken seriously it 
would undermine his ability to conduct a rational philosophical investigationi.  I argue that this 
epistemologically focused interpretation fails to accommodate the textual evidence found 
elsewhere in Descartes’s writings.  My reading of Descartes’s madness doubt in the First 
Meditation understands its role in his overall method of doubt as no different than the role of the 
dreaming doubtii.     
Section One: The Madness and Dreaming Doubt 
The scholastic doctrine mentioned above is targeted by the meditator in both the First and 
Sixth Meditations, “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either 
from the senses or through the senses” (AT vii 18; CSM II 12) and, “I easily convinced myself 
that I had nothing at all in the intellect which I had not previously had in sensation” (AT vii 75; 
CSM II 52).  These highlight two aspects of the scholastic doctrine: that the senses mediate the 
mind’s access to reality and the senses serve as the only source of the contents of the mind.  I 
understand the method of doubt in the First Meditation as an attempt to dislodge this first aspect 
and the subsequent meditations as an attempt to inter alia dislodge the second.  Ultimately, this 
clears the way for Descartes’s alternative doctrine that the mind has unmediated access to reality 
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and, furthermore, that the mind brings with it its own innate stockpile of contents with which to 
cognize this reality.   
 The general structure of the method of doubt in the First Meditation is to set forth a 
reason for doubt followed by a limitation on this reason.  Then a further, more encompassing 
reason is offered followed by another limitation until finally the meditator admits “that there is 
not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised” (AT vii 21; CSM 
II 14-5). 
 The meditator’s first reason for doubt is that the senses have deceived him in the past.  
Despite this feature of his senses, they deliver to him numerous other “obvious beliefs” that are 
impossible to doubt, e.g., that he is holding a piece of paper in his hands right now.  The 
meditator then presents another reason for doubt intended to encompass even these “obvious 
beliefs” by comparing himself to a madman “whose brains are so damaged by the persistent 
vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are paupers, or say 
they are dressed in purple when they are naked” (AT vii 19; CSM II 13).  Just as madmen are 
convinced of the truth of various falsehoods, it is possible that he too is convinced of the truth of 
these “obvious beliefs” when they are false.  But this possibility appears to be dismissed out of 
hand by the meditator, “I would be thought equally mad if I took anything from them [the 
insane] as a model for myself” (AT vii 19; CSM II 13).   
Yet, just as quickly as the madness doubt is dismissed, the meditator sarcastically 
remarks, “A brilliant piece of reasoning!” (AT vii 19; CSM II 13) and reconsiders that he is not 
so unlike the madman, since he is “a man who sleeps at night, and regularly has all the same 
experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake – indeed sometimes even more improbable 
ones” (AT vii 19; CSM II 13).  The state of dreaming would convince him equally as madness 
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would of the truth of the “obvious beliefs” when they are false.  Resisting these considerations, 
the meditator insists there is no way, at this very moment, he could be asleep and therefore be 
convinced of the truth of the “obvious beliefs” when they are false, since all of his present 
experiences have a distinctness dream experiences lack.  Yet, once again the meditator 
reconsiders, since he remembers past states of dreaming, in virtue of their distinctness, that have 
convinced him of the truth of the “obvious beliefs” when they were false.  He concludes that 
there is no sure sign which can be used to distinguish the state of dreaming from the state of 
being awake. 
I would like to focus my discussion of the meditator’s introduction of the madness and 
dreaming doubt around four questionsiii:  
(Q1) What does the meditator have in mind when speaking of madness? 
(Q2) Why does the meditator so quickly dismiss the madness doubt but take 
seriously the dreaming doubt? 
(Q3) Does the madness doubt have the same scope as the dreaming doubt? 
(Q4) Why does the meditator bring up the madness doubt at all?   
 
In the next section, I examine Frankfurt’s answers to these questions. 
Section Two: Madness as Undermining Reason 
 John Carriero characterizes the traditional epistemologically emphasized reading of the 
Meditations as one that focuses on Descartes’s handling of skepticism along with “certainty, 
justification of belief, and knowledge” (Carriero 2009, 2).  Frankfurt’s reading has exactly this 
kind of emphasis, since he understands the First Meditation as examining particular “rules of 
evidence” that “define policies to be followed in determining whether or not to accept a belief” 
and questioning each defined policy as to whether it is a “reasonable way to attain certainty” 
(Frankfurt 1970, p. 47). 
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Frankfurt thinks the meditator has a particular conception of madness in mind, namely 
that “an essential aspect of madness [is] to be unable to distinguish properly between reasonable 
and unreasonable judgments” (Frankfurt 1970, p. 52).  Support for this comes from the original 
French translation of ‘madmen’ as ‘insensées’ or “those who have lost their reason” (Frankfurt 
1970, 52).  In regards to (Q1), the meditators conception of madness is a state in which 
discernment of the reasonable is severely handicapped if not altogether missing.  Reason, then, is 
in some sense undermined by madness. 
This provides an answer to (Q2) why the meditator so quickly dismisses the madness 
doubt and why the dreaming doubt can be taken seriously, 
The whole point of his critical examination of his former opinions is to determine 
whether or not there are reasonable grounds for doubting them.  If he were to 
begin by suspending the judgment that he is reasonable, he would be unable ever 
to reestablish his confidence in his own ability to carry out his task (Frankfurt 
1970, p. 53).     
 
If the madness doubt were a reason for doubt, then the “obvious beliefs” provided by the senses 
plus the meditator’s general capacity to “conduct the investigation to which he wishes to devote 
himself” (Frankfurt 1970, p. 53) would be uncertain.  This latter uncertainty, Frankfurt suggests, 
would not be engendered if the meditator were to dismiss the madness doubt in favor of the 
dreaming doubt, 
Like the abnormal man, the dreamer generates sensory data of his own … The 
fact that he perceives non-veridical data is not due, however, to idiosyncrasy or to 
a defect in his individual constitution.  It cannot therefore be dismissed as a fact of 
merely personal relevance (Frankfurt 1970, p. 56).    
 
Frankfurt’s answer to (Q3) is that there is a difference of scope between the madness and 
dreaming doubt.  Dreaming is a “nonpathological equivalent of madness” (Frankfurt 1970, p. 56) 
that does not threaten one’s general capacity to conduct an investigation, but does cast doubt on 
just those deliverances of the senses one would consider to be “obvious beliefs”.   
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Why does the meditator bring up madness at all?  Frankfurt’s answer to (Q4) might be 
discerned from the following passage, 
Even if Descartes makes the most generous assumptions and supposes that he is a 
normal perceiver who obtains sensory data under conditions favorable in every 
respect discoverable by the senses, he cannot be certain that the sensory data he 
obtains will be veridical (my emphasis) (Frankfurt 1970, p. 58). 
 
Bringing up the madness doubt only to dismiss it serves to illustrate that the senses fail to deliver 
certainty even if we suppose they are in ideal conditions.  Doubting the epistemic states that are 
the upshot of the senses does not require one to go to such great lengths as supposing one is 
madiv.  Madness is, of course, amongst those conditions considered to be non-ideal.  We need 
only to examine experiences taken to be an ordinary “element in the common-sense picture of 
experience” (Frankfurt 1970, p. 57).     
Section Three: The Similarity of Madness and Dreaming 
Frankfurt claims that the meditator’s conception of madness is the inability to discern the 
reasonable from the unreasonable.  These claims are supported by no strong textual evidence 
within Descartes’s writings besides the French translator’s use of “insensées”.  I believe that 
Frankfurt’s focus on the epistemology of the Meditations obscures the obvious answer to (Q1).  
What the meditator has in mind when thinking of madness is answered immediately after the 
madness doubt is introduced,  
How could it be denied that these hands or this whole body are mine?  Unless 
perhaps I were to liken myself to a madman, whose brains are so damaged by the 
persistent vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when 
they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that 
their heads are made of earthenware, or that they are pumpkins, or made of glass 
(AT vii 19; CSM II 13). 
 
That is, madness is a physiological disturbance in the brain that causes one to be convinced of 
the truth of things that are false, mainly by bringing about particular inaccurate mental states.  
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Madness, then, is understood as quite similar to dreaming.  Nowhere else in Descartes’s writings 
does he give any indication that madness undermines reason in the way suggested by Frankfurtv. 
 I think my answer to (Q1) gains further support when it is understood that Frankfurt’s 
conception of madness requires the answer to (Q3) that it does, namely that there is a difference 
in scope between the madness doubt and the dreaming doubt.  I say this brings further support 
for my answer to (Q1) because the text clearly shows that neither Descartes nor his meditator 
thought there was such a difference.  The immediate evidence is the meditator’s recognition in 
the First Meditation that he is not so unlike a madman, since he is a man who dreams.  But I 
suspect this begs some questions against Frankfurt’s reading so I shall mention a few other 
places that suggest no scope difference is at work. 
I believe that Descartes thought that madness and dreaming are very similar if not exactly 
similar states.  It is a fair assumption that if madness and dreaming are similar states, then 
madness threatens one’s ability to conduct an inquiry only insofar as dreaming does.  But, as 
even Frankfurt will admit, the meditator does not think that dreaming does so threaten.  If 
dreaming does not threaten one’s ability to conduct an inquiry, neither does madness.  There 
would be, then, no scope difference between the madness doubt and the dreaming doubt.  
Therefore, given the similarity between the state of madness and dreaming, Frankfurt’s answer to 
(Q3) would be incorrect thereby bolstering support for my answer to (Q1).  But are there any 
passages suggesting the similarity between madness and dreaming? 
 In the Optics, Descartes says: 
First, it is the soul which sees, and not the eye; and it does not see directly, but 
only by means of the brain.  That is why madmen and those who are asleep often 
see, or think they see, various objects which are nevertheless not before their 
eyes: namely, certain vapours disturb their brain and arrange those of its parts 
normally engaged in vision exactly as they would be if these objects were present 
(AT vi 141; CSM I 172). 
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In this passage madmen and dreamers are directly compared to one another.  In fact, they are 
characterized in the same way as seeing and thinking falsely.  Descartes offers the same causal 
explanation for why this is the case citing a “disturbance” in their brains due to “vapours”.  This 
strongly suggests that not only did Descartes think madness and dreaming to be 
phenomenologically similar but, more importantly, that the same causal process explains this 
similarity.  This causal explanation is very similar to the one given by the meditator in the First 
Meditation for madness.  If he uses this explanation in the Optics to explain both madness and 
dreaming and uses it in the First Meditation to explain madness right before his discussion of 
dreaming, then I think it is fair to say Descartes thought of these states as very similar. 
 In the Fifth Set of Replies, Descartes says the following about the state of dreaming, 
Admittedly, when imagination or sensation is strongly active (as occurs when the 
brain is in a disturbed state), it is not easy for the mind to have leisure for 
understanding other things.  But when imagination is less intense, we often have 
the experience of understanding something quite apart from the imagination.  
When, for example, we are asleep and are aware that we are dreaming, we need 
imagination in order to dream, but to be aware that we are dreaming we need only 
the intellect (AT vii 358-9; CSM II 248). 
 
Here we see that imagination or sensation is correlated with a “disturbed” state of the brain and 
that dreaming requires the imagination and so requires the brain to be so disturbed.  Again, in the 
First Meditation and the Optics, we saw the state of madness characterized as a “disturbance” in 
the brain of some kind or other.  This again suggests a strong similarity between dreaming and 
madness.  I conclude, then, that we have good reasons to suppose that Descartes and his 
meditator thought of madness and dreaming as quite similar states.  Given this, we have no 
reason to think there is a scope difference between the madness doubt and the dreaming doubt.   
 Recall that Frankfurt’s answer to (Q2) was that the meditator dismissed the madness 
doubt in virtue of its threat to conducting his inquiry while the dreaming doubt did no such thing.  
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But if, as I argued above, the madness doubt does not threaten his ability to conduct an inquiry 
anymore than the dreaming doubt does, what is the explanation for the meditator’s remarks at 
AT vii 19; CSM II 13?  I believe these remarks are not in fact dismissive, but serve the same 
function as the earlier remarks that it is “impossible” to doubt some beliefs, e.g., that he is 
holding a piece of paper in his hands, and his later remarks that now his current experiences have 
a distinctness that dreaming experiences lack.  In other words, all of these remarks are part of the 
meditator’s ultimately failed attempts to resist the encroaching skepticism.  The remark ‘I would 
be thought equally mad if I took anything from them [the insane] as a model for myself’ at AT 
vii 19; CSM II 13 serves as just another ineffectual limitation on the presented doubts, since it is 
quickly undermined by the similarity of madness and dreaming.  Therefore, the madness doubt is 
taken no less seriously than the dreaming doubt.        
This, I believe, offers a satisfying explanation of the sarcasm found in the meditator’s 
comment ‘A brilliant piece of reasoning!’.  What the meditator is doing is dismissing the 
suggested limitation that he is nothing like a madman.  He is saying that it would not be crazy to 
suppose he is like a madman, since, when he dreams, he is in a very similar phenomenological 
state correlated with (and caused by) the same “melancholic vapour” disturbance in his brain. 
There remains the final question (Q4) of why the meditator brings up the madness doubt 
at all?  This question is especially pressing for my reading of the First Meditation, since madness 
and dreaming are similar states bringing the same things into doubt.  I believe the answer to this 
question lies not in the writings of Descartes, but in the writings of the skeptics prior to 
Descartes.  Janet Broughton (2002) has pointed out that the skeptics before Descartesvi 
frequently brought up madness and dreaming together in considerations of skepticism.  For 
instance, in Against the Logicians Sextus Empiricus, the famous Academic skeptic, says: 
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For as in waking life the thirsty man feels pleasure in indulging in drink, and the 
man who flees from a wild beast or any other object of terror shouts and cries 
aloud, so also in dreams delight is felt by the thirsty when they think they are 
drinking from a spring, and similarly fear is felt by those in terror … And just as 
in a normal state we believe and assent to very lucid appearances … so also in a 
state of madness some are similarly affected (7.403-5). 
 
And Socrates in Plato’s Theaetetus says, “Then let us not leave it incomplete.  There remains the 
question of dreams and disorders, especially madness and all the mistakes madness is said to 
make in seeing or hearing or otherwise misperceiving” (157e).  So I understand Descartes to 
simply be following the status quo in discussions of skepticism.  The madness doubt is brought 
up for the reason that traditionally when one writes about skepticism one writes both about 
madness and dreaming. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Frankfurt’s reading of Descartes’s madness doubt in the First 
Meditation is mistaken on several accounts.  In particular, neither Descartes nor his meditator 
conceives of madness as undermining reason.  Instead, the state of madness is 
phenomenologically very similar to the state of dreaming and both, for Descartes, have the same 
causal explanation.  In general, I believe that Frankfurt’s mistake lies in his overemphasis on 
epistemology when understanding the First Meditation.  With a better grasp of how Descartes 
understands the states of madness and dreaming it is seen why it just does not matter that I am 
not insanevii. 
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i In Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, Frankfurt offers the beginning suggestion of this line of interpretation, which 
has been elaborated by Ablondi (2007). 
ii Much of my understanding of Descartes’ Meditations has been influenced by John Carriero’s book Between Two 
Worlds (2009), which sees the Meditations in a more metaphysically oriented fashion than previous interpreters 
have.  In his own words, “A reading that seeks to leverage Descartes’s conception of mind out of external-world 
skepticism leaves as irrelevant or desperate too much of what is going on in the Meditations” (Carriero 2009, p. 3). 
iii These four questions were taken from Ablondi (2007). 
iv Although of course in order to doubt what Descartes calls the “simplest and most general things” one must in 
some sense go beyond mere common-sense experience.  Descartes accomplishes this by invoking the defective 
origins doubt (see AT vii 21; CSM II 14-5). 
v In Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilization he says the following in his discussion of two forms of madness, 
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The mind of the melancholic is entirely occupied by reflection, so that his imagination remains at 
leisure and in repose; the maniac’s imagination, on the contrary, is occupied by a perpetual flux of 
impetuous thoughts.  While the melancholic’s mind is fixed on a single object, imposing 
unreasonable proportions upon it, but upon it alone, mania deforms all concepts and ideas; either 
they lose their congruence, or their representative value is falsified; in any case, the totality of 
thought is disturbed in its essential relation to truth (Foucault 1965, p. 125).   
 
I find it interesting that the maniac, as described by Foucault, appears to fit more closely with the madman of 
Frankfurt’s reading while the melancholic appears to fit closer to the madman as I have understood it.  More 
interestingly, Descartes describes his madman as affected by “melancholic vapours”.  Now I hesitate to draw any 
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strong conclusions from the brief discussion I quoted from Foucault, but it does seem surprising that Descartes used 
“melancholia” rather than “mania” to characterize the madman of the First Meditation. 
vi This is certainly not meant to imply that Descartes was a skeptic (but see Popkin (1982) Descartes Against the 
Skeptics).	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